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Abstract
We evaluate the information content of admission conditions for study programs’
quality by investigating its relationship with graduates’ employability. We ﬁnd that
study programs with larger numeri clausi are associated with a higher probability
of ﬁnding a job. Additionally, compulsory admission exams seem to be informative
about study programs’ quality. Namely, study programs requiring the Math exam
appear to be linked with lower unemployment propensity. Cardoso et al. (2008),
however, found that those programs face lower demand when compared to other
studies. These paradoxical results suggest that students’ choices may be based on
insuﬃcient information on returns to higher education investment. That information
failure indicates that a Government intervention may be due.
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11 Introduction
Over the last decades, the Portuguese higher education sector witnessed an expansion
with no precedent. In the 90s, the number of students enrolled in tertiary education has
doubled, reaching 400,000 in 2000. Since then, demographic changes and large invest-
ments produced excess capacity, raising questions about public expenditure in tertiary
education and quality issues. In this context of excess supply and the consequent in-
creasing competition for students, admission conditions may be seen as an instrument of
ad i ﬀerentiation strategy (OECD, 2006). Simultaneously, Higher Education Institutions
(HEIs) have undergone an increasing pressure to contribute to economic and social goals
and to be more responsive to labour market needs (OECD, 2008), which has resulted in
greater focus on accountability and quality assurance mechanisms. Although quality is-
sues have been brought to the public discussion, there is insuﬃcient public information on
study programs’ quality in Portugal (OECD, 2006). Therefore, we look at admission con-
ditions and evaluate its information content regarding programs’ quality. Special attention
is devoted to the compulsory exams required by each study.
Although HEIs’ quality is not directly observable, several performance indicators have
been proposed to evaluate features that go from access and participation to research and
to labour market outcomes. Several studies have analyzed the relationship between HEIs’
quality and wage returns, concluding that institutional quality matters for graduates’
performance in labor markets (see Black and Smith, 2004, Dale and Krueger, 2002, and
Brewer et al., 1999). For example, Smith et al. (2000) discuss a performance indicator for
higher education institutions based on graduate employment outcomes. In fact, economists
ﬁnd labour market outcomes a natural way of evaluating student performance. This follows
from the standard human capital model, which sees education as an investment: students
bear the costs of attending school if they expect that these are outweighed by future
returns.
2In this paper, using data for the Portuguese public higher education system, at the
program/institution level, we infer programs’ quality through the admission conditions.
We do that by evaluating the impact of admission conditions, namely numeri clausi and
the compulsory exams required by each study, in particular the Math exam, on programs’
employability. The study beneﬁts from the data on graduates employability per study
program and institution, released in the beginning of 2008 by the Ministry of Science
Technology and Higher Education.
Foreshadowing the conclusions, it seems that making the Math exam compulsory is
associated with higher quality study programs, as that admission condition appears to be
linked with higher employability. This result suggests that high school students should look
at admission conditions as quality indicators when applying to higher education programs.
According to human capital theory we would expect study programs requiring a Math
exam to be among the most demanded by candidates to higher education. Paradoxically,
Cardoso et al. (2008) found that those programs face lower demand. This indicates the
existence of a market failure that may call for a State intervention.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses the admission conditions in the
context of the Portuguese higher education system. Section 3 describes the data and the
empirical analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Admission policies and information in the Portu-
guese higher education system
The Portuguese higher education system is a binary system with universities and poly-
technics as the main education providers. Access to the public higher education system is
regulated by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (MCTES, Min-
istério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Ensino Superior) through numeri clausi and admission
3policies, settled every school year. Each study program has to deﬁne a compulsory ex-
amination in one or two subjects, and the weight given to both secondary school grades
and exam(s), within the limits established by the Ministry itself. Currently, access to
public higher education works through a national competition based on students’ revealed
preferences (each candidate ranks up to six institution/program pairs) and GPA, which
is a weighted average of their marks in upper secondary education and in national exam-
inations. Such competition takes place in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase all places are
available. Places not ﬁlled in that phase are available for a second round.
The focus of the present analysis is the Portuguese public higher education system,
where important changes have been taking place. Namely, the number of candidates has
declined due to demographic changes and large investments in higher education occurred
in the 90s, which have resulted in large imbalances between demand and supply in the
Portuguese higher education system. Excess supply is represented in Figure 1, which
depicts the number of places available in the public higher education system and the
number of places ﬁl l e di nt h eﬁrst phase of the application process. These imbalances,
quantiﬁed in Portela et al. (2008), exacerbated the competition for candidates between
institutions, enhancing strategies of diﬀerentiation. Such strategies appear in a context in
which “public information on course content, program goals, quality and opportunities and
graduate employment is inadequate or unavailable” (OECD, 2006: 27). Although a new
accreditation agency, which will be in charge of study programs evaluation, was created
in 2007, so far the approval of new study programs has been a bureaucratic procedure, as
t h e yd on o td e p e n do na ne v a l u a t i o no ra c c r e d i t a t i o np r o c e s s .
Among diﬀerentiation strategies, the deﬁnition of admission conditions has had a ma-
jor role as they aﬀect the number of study program’s potential candidates (OECD, 2006).
Namely, national exams play a crucial role in deﬁning the pool of candidates, as some sub-
jects have low success rates. For example, exams on Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry
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Figure 1: Excess supply and percentage of study programs requiring Maths
only 26% of the students obtained a passing grade (27% in 2005, and 31% in 2004 and
2003). In Physics the share of students passing the exam was 30%, 47%, 37%,a n d22%,
respectively in 2006, 2005, 2004, and 2003, whereas in Chemistry, the shares were 35%,
52%, 41% and 53%.
As admission policies may have a decisive role in deﬁning the number of candidates and
students’ enrolment in higher education, which is the most important factor in the Gov-
ernment funding formula, HEIs may have diﬀerentiated strategies when deﬁning admission
conditions. On the one hand, given the very high failure rate, if study programs want to
target a larger pool of candidates, they should drop the Math exam as an admission con-
dition. This seems to have been the strategy of a large number of study programs. From
Figure 1 we observe that the percentage of study programs requiring the Math exam has
been decreasing steadily, from 33%, in 2003/2004, to 20.7%, in 2006/2007 (in 2007/2008
that percentage decrease further to 13.4%). On the other hand, institutions may opt to set
5more stringent admission conditions to target speciﬁc segments of the student population,
namely including one or two of those exams as pre-requisites and deﬁning a minimum ad-
mission grade above the passing grade. The ﬁeld of Economics provides a good example of
such diﬀerentiation: some study programs made the Math examination optional, to target
a larger pool of candidates, whereas University Nova of Lisbon set a higher minimum of
12.5/20 in the average application grade as a pre-requisite for application.
In this paper, we use that data on the number of graduated unemployed per study
program to analyse the information content of admission conditions on programs’ quality.
In other words, we test whether admission conditions reﬂect study programs’ quality and
could, therefore, work as a guide in students’ choices when applying to HEIs. Given the
restriction that the Math exam imposes on the pool of potential candidates, we focus our
analysis on that admission condition.
3 The data
This study focusses on the Portuguese public funded HEIs, which comprises 14 univer-
sities and 26 polytechnics, accounting approximately for 70% of the Higher Education
students. The present analysis uses data for the academic year of 2006/2007. A pair
study program/institution is taken as the unit of analysis. The data set used for the em-
pirical analysis comprises 974 pairs institution/program, representing 40 Higher Education
institutions.1
The study program size, proxied by numerus clausus, the exams required to apply to a
speciﬁc study program and the distinction between universities and polytechnics are among
the variables available.2 We also have information on the average of the GPA at entrance
1In 2006/2007, public funded HEIs oﬀered 576 study programs, corresponding to 991 pairs institu-
tion/program, and 46580 vacancies. Seventeen pairs were dropped from the analysis due to non-availability
of information on relevant variables.
2The student-teacher ratio is usually taken as a quality measure. As in the Portuguese context that
ratio is centrally imposed, we opt for using the program size, proxied by the numerurs clausus. This way
6of registered applicants in a given institution and program, which works as an indicator
of selectivity, which allow us to control for the quality of students (Sá et al., 2007). Smith
et al. (2000), for example, ﬁnd out that the educational background is relevant for the
probability of being unemployed or inactive for the UK university graduates. Additionally,
we have used the classiﬁcation of the programs in 10 ﬁelds of study adopted by the MCTES
in 2006: Agriculture, Architecture, Natural Sciences, Law and Social Sciences, Economics
and Business, Sports and Arts, Education, Humanities, Health, and Technologies.
Furthermore, in February 2008, the Portuguese Ministry of Science, Technology and
Higher Education has released information on the number of unemployed workers re-
gistered in the Government Employment Agencies per study program and institution
(GPEARI/MCTES, 2008). That data covers all the pairs of programs and institutions in
both the public and private sector. This information allows for the construction of employ-
ability indicators, a proxy for graduates’ unemployment per program/institution pair. We
calculate the ratio of the number of workers registered as of December 2007 in the Gov-
ernment Employment Centers to the number of graduates per program and institution in
the period 1996 to 2006, which we call unemployment propensity per program/institution.
The summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are reported
in Table 1. The average propensity to unemployment is 6.7%, while the average GPA of
registered applicants is 137.6 (out of 200), with a standard deviation of approximately
14.5. The average size of study programs is around 47 places, with a standard deviation
of approximately 39 places. About 20% of the pairs institution/program require a Math
exam, while only 2% require an exam in physics. For Chemistry, Biology and Portuguese
the ﬁgures are 5%, 11% and 7%, respectively. The most representative ﬁe l do fs t u d yi n
terms of number of pairs institution/program is Technologies with 22%, followed by Law
and Social Sciences with more than 16%. The least represented ﬁe l di sS p o r t sa n dA r t s
with a little bit more than 3% of all study programs. Almost half of the study programs
we do control for the existence of economies of scale.
7are in polytechnic institutions.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Standard
Variable Mean deviation
Unemployment propensity 0.067 (0.121)
Grade Point Average (GPA) of registered applicants 137.59 (14.47)









Law and Social Sciences 0.161
Economics and Business 0.109






Notes: The sample under analysis corresponds to 974 observations and 40 institutions.
Unemployment propensity is bounded between 0 and 1. Minimum and maximum values
for the Grade Point Average are 109 and 185.10, respectively, whereas 5 and 550 are the
minimum and maximum study programme sizes, respecively. All the remaining variables
are dummy variables.
4 Empirical analysis
The graduates’ unemployment propensity indicator and information on admission condi-
tions are used in our empirical analysis, which aims at estimating the impact of admission
conditions on graduates’ employability. As argued above, this will allow us to associate
admission conditions and study programs’ quality. The dependent variable in the empir-
8ical model, the propensity for unemployment of a pair institution/program, is a fractional
response variable, which suggests the use of fractional models.
Take the model speciﬁcation as
E (PUNEMP|x)=β0 + β1AGPA + β2SIZE + β3Polytec+ γ1E + γ2I + γ3F (1)
where PUNEMP is the propensity for unemployment of graduated students; AGPA is
the average of the GPA of registered applicants; SIZE is the numerus clausus, which
we take for the study program size; Polytec is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for
polytechnic institutions; E is a vector of dummy variables for entrance exams required
by each institution/program pair, which includes the exams of Math, Physics, Chemistry,
Biology and Portuguese; I is a vector of dummy variables for each of the 40 institutions
under analysis; and ﬁnally F is another vector of dummy variables for the 10 ﬁelds of
study.
To start with, the model in equation (1) is estimated by OLS (see the results in the
ﬁrst column of Table 2). However, the estimation of equation (1) by OLS has some
problems, and then should be taken just as a benchmark. First, OLS does not guarantee
that the predicted values are in the unit interval. Second, the model does not pass some
speciﬁcation tests. We performed a RESET test based on the regression of ˆ ui on xi, ˆ y2
i,
ˆ y3
i,w h e r eˆ ui are the OLS residuals, and ˆ y2
i, ˆ y3
i, are polynomials of the OLS ﬁtted values,
and xi deﬁnes the set of regressors. A statistic NR2 ∼ χ2
2 of 19.7,w i t hap − value of
0.0001, is obtained and leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis under which equation
(1) is true. The robust RESET test statistic is about 11.3,w i t hap − value of 0.0035,
which conﬁrms the previous result.
9Table 2: Results for unemployment propensity
OLS QMLE
Variable Estimates Estimates Marginal Eﬀects
AGPA of registered applicants -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0054) (0.0003)
Study program size -0.0002∗∗ -0.0031∗ -0.0002∗
(0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0001)
Maths -0.0335∗∗ -0.5702∗∗ -0.0253∗∗∗
(0.0150) (0.2345) (0.0091)
Physics -0.0051 -0.2056 -0.0097
(0.0112) (0.2356) (0.0102)
Chemistry -0.0094 -0.2441 -0.0114
(0.0162) (0.3734) (0.0157)
Biology 0.0261 0.4781 0.0290
(0.0213) (0.3797) (0.0270)








Robust RESET 11.3168 0.6697
[0.0035] [0.7155]
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ :1 0 % ∗∗ :5 % ∗∗∗: 1%. Robust standard errors
in parentheses; p − values in square brakets. The dependent variable is unemployment
propensity. AGPA stands for the average of the Grade Point Average. The QMLE
regression is estimated by Generalized Linear Model, with family binomial and link logit.
It includes a set of dummies for institutions, polytechnic institution, and ﬁelds of study
(Agriculture, Architecture, Natural Sciences, Law and Social Sciences, Economics and
Business, Sports and Arts, Education, Health and Technologies). SSR stands for Sum of
Squared Residuals and SER is the standard error of the regression.
We opt for an alternative solution discussed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).3 Take
the assumption
E (yi|xi)=G(xiβ), (2)
valid for all i,a n d0 <G(z) < 1 for all z ∈ R.U s u a l l yG(.) is a cumulative distribution,
3Papke and Wooldridge (1996) also discuss other alternatives: (i) model the log-odds ratio as a linear
function; (ii) use of the beta distribution to model the fractional variable y. The latter, however, is not
robust to a distributional failure.
10with the two most common distributions being the logistic distribution and the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a quasi-
likelihood method for estimating the β. The authors use in particular the Bernoulli log-
likelihood, which provides consistent estimates of β, as long as the assumption stated by
equation (2) is valid.
When we take a fractional dependent variable, as is the case of the present analysis,
the use of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) and the logistic function follows
as natural choices from the above arguments. The model is then deﬁned as
E (PUNEMP|x)=G(α0 + α1AGPA + α2SIZE + α3Polytec+ τ 1E + τ 2I + τ3F)
(3)
where G(.) is the logistic distribution. The results for the estimation of equation (3) are
provided in the second column of Table 2; the third column presents its marginal eﬀects.
The robust RESET test is 0.6697 with a p − value of 0.3818 (the statistic and p −
value for the non-robust test are 6.4742 and 0.0409, respectively), which indicates no
misspeciﬁcation problem in equation (3). Furthermore, the sum of squared residuals (SSR)
is lower than the obtained when the model is estimated by OLS (12.7 compared with 13.0),
and the R2 of the second model is higher (0.1119 against 0.0939). The standard errors
of the regressions (SER) are not directly comparable. In face of the evidence gathered,
estimates presented in the second column of Table 2 are the ones we look at in detail.
The marginal eﬀects associated with the estimation of equation (3) are similar to the
ones obtained for the OLS estimation. From that set of results, it appears that a better pool
of registered candidates, measured by their average grade, is, as expected, associated with
a lower unemployment propensity for graduates. Also, larger programs, those oﬀering more
places each year, have, on average, a lower unemployment propensity. This might capture
the prestige, or implantation in the market, of a speciﬁc study program. Higher average
GPA is associated with lower unemployment propensity, while bigger study programs are
11related with lower unemployment propensity, ceteris paribus.
The most conspicuous result in Table 2 concerns the exams required to apply to a
study program. Study programs that require a Portuguese exam seem to be associated
with a higher propensity for unemployment, in about 3.7 percentage points. Exams on
Physics, Chemistry and Biology are not independently relevant in the explanation of our
dependent variable. Requiring the Math exam impacts negatively on the propensity for
unemployment in about 2.5 percentage points. This result is statistically and economically
signiﬁcant, and it goes in the same direction of previous research for other countries. For
example, Smith et al. (2000) ﬁnd out that an A-level in Mathematics appears to reduce
the probability of becoming unemployed or inactive after graduation, in the UK, whereas
James et al. (1989) found that the number of semesters of math in high school are a good
investment when it comes to the earnings of higher education graduates.
Several mechanisms could operate to generate the results that requiring the Math exam
is linked to higher employability. On the one end, the Maths exam may be working as
a ﬁlter to attract the best students, who are expected to have better performance in the
labor market. We attempt to control for it, by including the average GPA. On the other
hand, a better pool of students enables the program/institution to provide better and more
demanding trainnig, which in turn will result in better labour market outcomes. That is,
the requirement of a Math exam seems to work as an indicator of higher employability,
and, therefore, as an indicator of study program’s quality. These results suggest that
competition for students, and the diﬀerentiation strategies that followed through changes
in admission conditions as described in Section 2, resulted in higher quality programs
keeping the Math exam as a compulsory exam, while several programs have made the
Math exam optional.
According to the human capital theory and given these results, we should expect
candidates to HEIs to prefer study programs that require the Math exam as it seems to
be an indicator of the program’s quality and therefore to guarantee better employment
12prospects. In fact, choosing a study program that includes the Math exam as an admission
condition seems to work as an unemployment insurance. Following the predictions of the
human capital theory we should observe a higher demand for those study programs.
Paradoxically, previous results on the Portuguese higher education system, presented
in Cardoso et al. (2008), indicate that having a Math exam as an admission requirement
reduces demand for a study program by about 42%, when looking at the number of students
w h op l a c eas p e c i ﬁc study program as their ﬁrst choice. That is, although we concluded
that degrees that include Math as a pre-requisite have a higher employability they do not
seem to attract more students. These paradoxical results may be the consequence of an
information failure; i.e., applicants to higher education may not have enough information
when choosing their study programs. Furthermore, although the longer-term beneﬁts of
studying Math seem to be large enough, students and their families may not be able to
take it into account earlier in their education. Given the existing funding scheme, which
depends mainly on the number of registered students, HEIs do not have an incentive to
solve this information problem, as their strategies focus on short run demand (Figure 1
corroborates this hypothesis as it shows a clear decrease in the share of study programs
requiring a Math exam). There is therefore room for a governmental intervention in order
to help families to incorporate the market signals in their decision-making processes and
invest in studying math.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In a context of excess capacity and increasing competition for candidates to higher educa-
tion, adjustment in admission conditions has been part of HEIs diﬀerentiation strategies.
Among changes in admission conditions, the steady decrease in the number of study pro-
grams requiring the Math exam stands out. In this paper we use a graduates’ employabil-
ity indicator and estimate a fractional model to infer about the relation between selection
13conditions and study program quality.
Apart from other controls, the type of national exams deﬁned as a pre-requisite and
the mean GPA are accounted for. We ﬁnd that larger study programs tend to have
higher employability. As expected, higher average GPA at entrance appears to result in a
lower propensity to become unemployed. Compulsory admission exams, the focus of our
analysis, seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on graduates’ employability. Namely, we do
detect a link between requiring the Math exam and employability. Therefore, requiring
a Math exam as an admission condition may be seen as an indicator of study program
quality. In a context of increasing competition for students it seems that study programs
that kept the Math exam as a compulsory admission condition are associated with higher
quality. This means that when choosing between study programs in the same ﬁeld and
institution, with the same size and with a pool of registered applicants of similar human
capital stock, requiring the Math exam should be a criterion to take into account as it
may signal program quality, and consequently its employability.
In fact, undergraduates’ labour market performance works as a market test to study
programs’ quality, indicating future returns of students investment in higher education.
Our estimates suggest that study programs that make the Math exam compulsory are
associated with higher employability. Therefore, students are expected to prefer study
programs requiring a Math exam as it seems to be a good indicator of study programs
quality. However, previous estimates suggest that degrees that require the Math exam
face lower demand when compared to other studies (Cardoso et al. 2008).
These results suggest that candidates to higher education do not have enough inform-
ation when choosing study programs. In particular, poor and less educated families may
be ill informed to evaluate the kind of market signals identiﬁed above. If the paradox we
identiﬁed in this paper has its roots in an information failure, a natural policy prescription
would be for the Government to publicise study programs’ employability and highlight the
relevance of studying Math for primary and secondary school students. The publication of
14the number of unemployed graduates per program/institution, used in this paper, is a ﬁrst
step in ﬁlling that gap. The study of Math in primary and secondary schools should be
understood as a merit good, which students should be compelled to consume.4 As o l u t i o n
to this problem could be to make the discipline of Math compulsory in high school. These
results may also provide a rationale for the Government to set standards for school scores
in Math national exams, as well as to provide the necessary means to reach them. This is
an issue that deserves further research in the future and the attention of policymakers.
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